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A CASE FOR INCREASED DISCLOSURE
Deborah Abramovsky*
I. Introduction
An experienced criminal defense attorney may, on occasion, be
informed by a client that the client has committed, or will commit,
homicide, rape or other savage crimes. When a client confides such
information, the attorney faces a choice: should he remain silent
about this information which the client has revealed in confidence,
or should he report it to law enforcement authorities? An even
greater dilemma arises when a client turns over to his attorney fruits
or instrumentalities of a crime for safekeeping. May an attorney
conceal evidence of a crime? What happens when an attorney learns
from his corporate client of an ongoing fraud by the corporation?
Should he be required to disclose information that would aid in
rectifying the fraud?
To resolve these dilemmas, an attorney must weigh his obligations
to his client against his obligations to the profession and to society.'
Although the client would want the attorney to keep the information
confidential, there are countervailing societal interests that warrant
disclosure of such information and evidence. 2 It is often difficult
to determine where the rights of clients end and those of society
begin.
Each time the legal profession amends the ethical codes and rules
by which it governs itself,3 as it did recently during the debates over
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules), 4
* B.F.A., State University of New York (Buffalo); M.A., New York University;
J.D., Pace University School of Law.
1. The responsibilities of a lawyer are set forth in the Preamble to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which states in pertinent part: "A lawyer is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality. of justice." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Preamble (1983) [hereinafter cited as RULES].
2. See infra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
3. Lawyer conduct in the United States was originally governed by the Canons
of Professional Ethics (Canons), which were adopted by the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) in 1908. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Ops., Foreword, at ix (1947). In 1969, a Model Code of Professional
Responsibility was drafted and adopted by the ABA. ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL
ON PROF. CONDUCT (BNA) 01:301 (1984) [hereinafter cited as LAWYER'S MANUAL].
In August, 1983, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Rules, which replaced
the entire Code. LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra, at 01:101 and 01:301.
4. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text, which discuss the controversy
over adoption of the RULES.
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difficult choices must be made. The final version of Model Rule
1.6 (Rule 1.6), which governs disclosure of client confidences, allows
permissive disclosure in certain situations but does not mandate
disclosure under all circumstances.5
This Article examines situations where the client reveals infor-
mation about a future violent crime,6 entrusts fruits and instru-
mentalities of a crime to his attorney, 7 or reveals an ongoing course
of corporate fraud. It concludes that the American Bar Association's
(ABA) final version of Rule 1.6 places unwarranted emphasis on
client confidentiality to the detriment of societal interests. The ul-
timate goals of truth and the preservation of human life should far
outweigh concern for maintaining the confidentiality of information
imparted by the client. Therefore, certain limited exceptions to the
confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.69 should be recognized.
II. The Duties of a Lawyer
A lawyer must represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law.' 0 However, a lawyer as an officer of the court owes a duty
5. RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (1983). The final version of Rule 1.6, entitled
"Confidentiality of Information," provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing
a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm; or (2) to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's rep-
resentation of the client.
Id.
6. See infra Section II.
7. See infra Section IV.
8. See infra Section V.
9. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
10. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as CODE]. Ctnon 7 includes Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-1, which states:
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes
Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The profes-
sional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profes-
sion which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure
and protect available legal rights and benefits . ...
Id. EC 7-1; see also id. DR 7-101 and 7-102.
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to society to protect its members from imminent physical injury or
death." The attorney-client relationship is governed by these two
legal and ethical principles. These principles are not as antithetical
as they appear to be. Although Canon 7 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code)12 requires zealous representation,
it also makes clear that the representation must be within the bounds
of the law. 3 Thus, while the attorney's primary obligation is to his
client, he also is obliged to both society and to his profession.
A. Officer of the Court
As an officer of the court, an attorney must seek justice and
equity. '4 The practice of law is more than an occupation, and lawyers
are not mere profit seekers. 5 The lawyer owes allegiance to the
courts in which he appears and to the criminal justice system.' 6 Both
moral and ethical principles dictate that attorneys not hinder the
11. P.M. BROWN, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, in THE
LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 34
n.10, quoting trial lawyer W. Sidney Davis of New York who asserted:
When an American lawyer raises his or her right hand to take the oath
for admission to the bar he or she takes on as a first responsibility the
commitment to serve the public interest and our system of justice: to
be foremost an officer of the court. Within that context, an attorney
takes on the responsibility of a solicitor-advisor to his clients; and finally,
when disputes regarding his or her clients' rights and obligations cannot
otherwise be reasonably resolved, an attorney assumes the responsibility
of a barrister-advocate-but only an advocate who serves his client within
the letter and the spirit of his responsibilitites as an officer of the court.
Id.
12. CODE, supra note 10, Canon 7.
13. Id.
14. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1024 (1976). In Thornton, the court stated that defense counsel must use "all
honorable means to see that justice is done," rather than going to any lengths to
see that the defendant is acquitted. Id. at 438.
15. Harrell, Preserving Professionalism, 69 A.B.A.J. 864 (1983); Brown, supra
note 11, at 31. But see Lawyers for Hire for Anything?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11,
1983, at A26, col. 1. The author asserts that confidentiality may be sacrificed
where the attorney's financial interests are threatened.
16. Thornton, 357 A.2d at 437; see also CODE, supra note 10, DR 7-103(B),
which imposes a duty of fairness on public prosecutors, to "make timely disclosure
to counsel for the defendant . . . of the existence of evidence, known to the
prosecutor . . . that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree
of the offense, or reduce the punishment." Id. This provision is discussed in United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963). The prosecutor's duty has been described as a dual obligation to prosecute
vigorously those who prey upon members of society and to secure justice. See
NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13.
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judicial process but, rather, that they encourage and facilitate con-
formity with the law.' 7
The fact-finding process is fundamental to the administration of
justice. 8 In support of this principle, an attorney is prohibited from
knowingly engaging in certain types of conduct such as using per-
jured testimony or false evidence, 19 assisting his client in fraudulent
or unlawful conduct,2 0 engaging in unlawful conduct or violating a
disciplinary rule. 21 Moreover, an attorney should not knowingly file
a suit designed solely to harass or injure a defendant, 22 or knowingly
make a- false statement of law or fact. 23 In addition to these ethical
proscriptions which protect the administration of justice, an affirm-
ative duty arises when, in the course of representation, a lawyer
learns that his client has defrauded a person or tribunal. This duty
requires the lawyer to advise his client to rectify the fraud.2 4 If the
client cannot or will not do so, the lawyer should reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal provided that the information
does not qualify as a confidence or secret, in which case it may be
protected by the confidentiality rule.25
An attorney is not a passive observer of the judicial system. The
attorney is an integral part of the judicial system26 as a participant
17. See Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Sup. Ct.
Iowa 1976) (en banc).
18. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 4, at 4.6, 4.7, 4.88 (2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
19. CODE, supra note 10, DR 7-102(A)(4).
20. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
21. Id. DR 7-102(A)(8).
22. Id. DR 7-102(A)(1).
23. Id. DR 7-102(A)(5).
24. Id. DR 7-102(B)(1). An attorney must not knowingly permit a witness to
lie. In re Hardenbrook, 135 A.D. 634, 121 N.Y.S. 250 (1st Dep't 1909), aff'd,
199 N.Y. 539, 92 N.E. 1086, app. den., 144 A.D. 928, 129 N.Y.S. 1126 (1st Dep't
1911) (disbarment after attorney knowingly recalled perjuring witness); In re Crary,
223 A.D. 277, 228 N.Y.S. 340 (3d Dep't 1928) (one year suspension for un-
professional and reprehensible conduct in connection with perjury by witness); In
re Barach, 279 Pa. 89, 123 A. 727 (1924) (disbarment where attorney permitted
witnesses to testify falsely); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d
298 (Iowa 1976) (en banc) (disbarment where attorney knowingly permitted perjury
at deposition).
25. RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6. Before the emergence of the Code, the
Canons provided:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice
against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper
discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the
unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions. . ..
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (ABA 1957) [hereinafter cited as CANONS].
26. CODE, supra note 10, EC 8-7.
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in the fact-finding process at the trial as well as in pre- and post-
trial proceedings. Therefore, he is obliged to preserve and promote
the integrity of the judicial system.2 7 An attorney fulfills this ob-
ligation by conforming to the principles embodied in the Code."8
B. Duty to Society
A lawyer has moral obligations to members of society other than
his client, including those who are likely to become victims of his
client's crimes.2 9 When a client informs his lawyer that he plans
some act of murder or mayhem, decency and humanity dictate that
the attorney warn the potential victim, reveal the intended crime to
the authorities or otherwise prevent the harm.3 0
C. Ethical Duties Governing Lawyers
As members of a self-regulated profession, lawyers undertake a
grave responsibility." Public confidence in the profession can be
maintained only if attorneys scrupulously obey ethical principles. 2
Therefore, the lawyer must never forget his moral obligations to
society." The rules of confidentiality should not be used to facilitate
criminal activity, nor should they supersede the protection of human
life.3 4 Contrary to one view,3 5 public confidence in lawyers is not
dependent upon whether lawyers keep client secrets regardless of the
consequences to innocent victims.3 6 Describing the negative aspects
of confidentiality, one colleague aptly stated that it:
27. Id. EC 8-7 and 8-9.
28. See CODE, supra note 10, Preamble.
29. See generally F.R. MARKS, K. LESWING, B.A. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER,
THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972). The authors assert that:
"the development of standards of professional conduct . . . implicit[ly] . .
recogni[zes] that both higher principle and the interest of the public may serve to
limit the extent of action on behalf of a client." Id. at 9 n.4.
30. See 1 ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 18, 4-3.7 at 4-50; A.H.GOLDMAN,
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 128 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
GOLDMAN].
31. See Brown, supra note 11, at 65.
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
34. GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 134-35.
35. See, e.g., In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 367 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d
713 (4th Cir. 1967), quoting SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.D.C. 1948),
aff'd, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 232, 184 F.2d 691 (1950), judgment order vacated as
moot, 340 U.S. 908 (1951).
36. See Lawyers for Hire for Anything?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, at A26,
col. 1 (editorial); Reeves, The Trouble With Lawyers, New York Magazine, July
29, 1974, at 27; see also The Gallup Poll Public Opinion 1196 (1977); Gallup Poll:
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frees the lawyer from the risk of having to bite the hand that
feeds him - he can usually hide behind the excuse of confidentiality
while his client loots, steals and defrauds. This confidentiality on
the part of the lawyer lends solace to the client wrongdoer because
he has a professional assistant whose loyalty is absolute.3 7
1. The Existing Code of Professional Responsibility
Under the present Code, a lawyer is directed not to reveal client
confidences except under limited circumstances. Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 4-1O(C)(3)38 provides that a lawyer may reveal "[t]he intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime." ' 39 Essentially, this provision means that a lawyer
may reveal a client's secret. Under no circumstances is disclosure
mandatory. Instead, the attorney is given discretion to determine
whether disclosure is appropriate.40
2. The Model Rules
a. Mandatory Disclosure Proposed
An early draft of Rule 1.7 of the Rules, reflecting a different
philosophy, provided that "a lawyer shall disclose information about
a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from
committing an act that would result in death, serious bodily harm
or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of an-
other."' 41 Had this provision been adopted, it would have altered
substantially the attorney's obligation to his client. For the first
time, a viable standard of mandatory disclosure, applicable in enum-
erated circumstances, would have been established. While some mem-
bers of the legal community welcomed the advent of mandatory
disclosure, 42 many groups and individuals strongly opposed this ex-
Public Opinion 209-10 (1981). These polls indicate that a large segment of the
public rates the moral and ethical standards of the legal profession as average to
low or very low.
37. Clark, Fear and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the Kutak
Commission's Rules, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 79, 81 (1983).
38. CODE, supra note 10, DR 4-101(C)(3).
39. Id.
40. RULES, supra note 1, Comment to Rule 1.6. The comment states that a
"lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1) does
not violate this Rule." Id.
41. RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (Discussion Draft 1982).
42. For example, only recently a committee of the New Jersey State Bar As-
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ception to the requirement of confidentiality. 43 Notably, both the
New York City and New York State Bar Associations rejected the
principle of mandatory disclosure. 44 Declaring the existing provisions
of DR 4-101 "far superior" to proposed Rule 1.7, the Committee
of Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar
Association joined other critics in attacking mandatory disclosure. 4'
b. The ABA Votes
• Criticism by bar associations and law professors 46 among others
resulted in modification of the proposed rule. Two votes were taken
by the ABA House of Delegates in February and August, 1983.
47
In August, a final version of the Rules was adopted.4 8 Rule 1.6,
sociation, headed by United States District Court Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise,
recommended mandatory disclosure of intended serious crimes. Flaherty, The Model
Rules Face Rocky Road, Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 9, col. 1; see Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Winter,
Muting the Whistle, 69 A.B.A. J. 421 (1983); Schanberg, To Tell the Truth, We
Can't, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1983, at A23, col. 4 (letter to editor).
43. The American College of Trial Lawyers, as well as the New York State
Bar Association, devised amendments to replace the mandatory disclosure provision.
Additionally, the New York State Bar Association adamantly opposed much of
the proposed Code. See New York State Bar Association, Report of the Special
Committee to Review ABA Draft Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1980).
The results of a poll of convention delegates can be found in Lawyers Vote for
Disclosure If Needed to Correct Perjury, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1983, at A24, col.
1; see also Wermeil, ABA Rejects Proposed Ethics Guideline Designed to Encourage
Whistle Blowing, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 6, col. 2, 3.
44. The Committee of Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Bar Association
of the City of New York concluded that "the current rule DR 4-101 which permits
disclosure where a client intends to commit a crime, reflects a sufficient balance
of the competing societal interests [so] that any broadening of the permissible
disclosure of confidences or secrets is unwarranted." New York City Bar Association
Committee Reports on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 18 (July 1980)
(based on discussions held on January 30, 1980).
The Committee further determined that DR 7-102(B), which mandates disclosure
to rectify a fraud unless a confidence or secret. is involved, also represents an
appropriate balance of the competing interests. Id. Moreover, the Committee opined
that on the whole "except with regard to the need for permissive disclosure to
protect against death or serious bodily harm the provisions of the current Code
dealing with confidentiality are far superior to Rule 1.7 [of the proposed Code,
dealing with the same subject matter]." Id. at 19.
45. Id. at 19.
46. See Taylor, Of Lawyers, Ethics and Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983,
at F4, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
47. See Wermeil, ABA Rejects Proposed Ethics Guideline Designed to Encourage
Whistle Blowing, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 6, col. 2. See generally Flaherty,
supra note 42.
48. Flaherty, supra note 42, at 1, col. 1.
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formerly Rule 1.7, in its final form, increased and strengthened the
existing guarantee of confidentiality. The mandatory disclosure pro-
vision was deleted from Rule 1.6, and in its place permissive dis-
closure was inserted. 49 Moreover, disclosure was limited to a few
specific situations, and even under these circumstances, the attorney
was vested with discretion as to when and how to reveal his client's
secrets.5 0 A substantial change was made in section (b)(2). Originally,
this section provided for discretionary disclosure of a client's intention
to commit criminal acts likely to result in death, substantial bodily
harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another." The final draft of Rule 1.6, however, deleted the discre-
tionary disclosure option in cases of financial and property crimes. 2
Moreover, when an attorney is aware that his client is defrauding
others in a business context, he is obligated to maintain the secret
and may not divulge client secrets in order to rectify the fraud5 3
1II. Future Crimes
When a client declares or even hints to his attorney that he intends
to commit a crime, the attorney is placed in a precarious position.
Numerous options are available. At the very least, the attorney may
counsel against engaging in criminal activity.14 The attorney may
withdraw from representation. 51 If the client has provided specific
information regarding the intended crime, the lawyer may seek to
prevent the crime by warning the intended victim or his family. 6
In certain situations, the attorney may elect to inform the police or
other authorities. However, any attempt to warn an individual of
the client's intention involves revealing client secrets. 7 Prior to taking
such a step, an attorney should weigh his competing moral, ethical
49. Id. at 9, col. 1.
50. See supra note 5.
51. See Taylor, supra note 46, at F4, col. 5.
52. See supra note 5.
53. See Taylor, Lawyers Vote for Disclosure if Needed to Correct Perjury, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1983, at A24, col. 1.
54. See Panel Discussion, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 639, 641 (1981) (confidentiality
privilege allows lawyer to dissuade client from improper course of conduct).
55. See CODE, supra note 10, DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) (1983) (lawyer may withdraw
if client "[plersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct").
56. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for discussion of the need
for disclosure of imminent serious crime.
57. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 405 (1975)
(revelation of ongoing larceny by attorney would constitute disclosure of client
secrets).
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and legal duties. 8 As the late Robert Kutak59 pointed out, an attorney
contemplating disclosure of client confidences with regard to future
crimes must weigh three questions under the permissive standard of
Rule 1.6.60 First, the lawyer must determine the nature of the client's
conduct; that is, whether the client's conduct is criminal. Second,
is it likely that tangible property will be destroyed, funds embezzled,
or a human life taken? Third, to what extent is disclosure necessary
to prevent the consequences? 6' After weighing these factors, the
attorney is vested with discretion to disclose client confidences. 62 A
responsible attorney may endeavor to analyze these considerations
and make a proper determination. A less responsible lawyer may
not bother since he is not obligated to engage in such a weighing
process. Mandatory disclosure would obviate the need for this lengthy
analysis.
Under the Code and the Rules, when a client intimates that he
is arranging to "torch ' 63 real property to collect insurance proceeds
or to bribe a public official, the attorney may properly guard the
secret.64 Even more anomalously, if a client informs his attorney
that key witnesses will not be able to testify against him because
they will have "accidents," the lawyer has no duty to alert either
the intended victims or the police. 65
Although an attorney's role is to advise and defend, he should
never become a knowing accomplice in his client's criminal activity. 66
When the lawyer knows that a crime will be committed in the future
58. See RULES, supra note 1, Preamble ("[W]ithin the framework of these Rules
many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided
by the basic principles underlying the Rules.").
59. Former Chairman, American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards, commonly known as the "Kutak Commission." See
Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22 WASHBURN L. REV 413 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Kutak].
60. Kutak, supra note 59, at 427.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 426.
63. This term is used by lawyers in its colloquial sense, meaning "to set fire
to." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2412 (3d ed. 1976).
64. See Crystal, Confidentiality Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
30 U. KAN. L. REV. 215, 232 (1982) (disclosure not required where "client's conduct
does not involve death, substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another person").
65. Id. ("The Model Rule gives lawyers discretion to reveal confidential in-
formation in order to prevent conduct that involves serious harm to others rather
than imposing a duty on lawyers to do so.").
66. See RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.2(d); CODE, supra note 10, EC 7-5 (1983).
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but sits back to wait for its completion, arguably, he is an ac-
complice. 67 Withdrawing from representation is a feeble response
which serves only to assuage the attorney's conscience. A lawyer
should not be a passive observer of his client's criminal activity.
When a lawyer seeks to prevent a crime, not only is the putative
victim saved from harm, but society is spared the direct and indirect
costs of making the victim whole.
Comments to Rule 1.6 indicate that criminal defendants are likely
to make boastful and idle threats, and it is, therefore, unlikely that
the danger to the threatened party is real. 68 However, a lawyer is
not trained to evaluate a client's psychological make-up and should
not be placed in a position where he must determine the reality of
a threat of criminal conduct before deciding whether to alert the
intended victim. 69 Mandatory disclosure is preferable to a standard
that requires lawyers to exercise discretion in areas in which they
are inadequately trained to properly exercise that discretion. Fur-
thermore, when gambling with human life, the stakes are simply
too high to justify a lawyer's inaction.
It also has been suggested that mandatory disclosure will stem
the flow of information from clients to their attorneys.70 However,
there is no empirical evidence that broader disclosure rules would
hinder or even affect the attorney-client relationship. 71 Clients will
always have to confide in their attorneys to insure informed advice.
Existing socio-economic barriers already preclude complete honesty
between a client and his lawyer, 72 and permissive disclosure provisions
regarding future crimes will in no way encourage further candor.
The integrity of the legal profession and that of the individual
attorney can best be protected by requiring mandatory disclosure of
future crimes.
67. Kutak, supra note 59, at 426.
68. See, e.g., RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 comment.
69. See generally Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975), which discusses difficulties encountered by psychiatrists
in predicting present dangerousness of those who have committed criminal acts in
the past.
70. See RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 comment.
71. See Comment, Proposed Model Rule 1.6." Its Effect on a Lawyer's Moral
and Ethical Decisions With Regard to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 BAYLOR
L. REV. 561, 572 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment]; Burt, Conflict and Trust
Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J. 1015, 1028 (1980-1981).
72. See Comment, supra note 71, at 572 n.77; Crystal, supra note 64, at 224
(racial and socio-economic barriers prevent totally honest communications from
clients to attorneys, and client may not have known attorney long enough to entrust
him with harmful facts).
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A. Recommendations-Adoption of Proposed Model Rule 1.7
Despite the trend toward greater confidentiality 3 the concept of
mandatory disclosure, as embodied in proposed Rule 1.7, is necessary
to our criminal justice system. Presiding Justice Francis T. Murphy
of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, asserted that the final proposed version of Rule 1.6
"protects a regiment of criminals." '7 4 Judge Murphy aptly described
Rule 1.6 when he wrote: "A rule that allows a lawyer discretion
to disclose a client's intention to murder or inflict serious bodily
injury, but requires him to keep silent about that client's intention
to commit other grave crimes, is indefensible. '75
In response, the commentary to the Rules equivocates, stating that
it is arguable that a lawyer should have a professional obligation
to "make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily
injury which the lawyer ' 7 6 knows is "intended by a client." 7 7 How-
ever, "[it is very difficult for a lawyer to 'know' when such a
heinous purpose will actually be carried out for the client may have
a change of mind."'78 To require disclosure when a client intends
such an act, at risk of disciplinary liability if the assessment of the
client's purpose turns out to be wrong, would be to impose a penal
risk that might interfere with the lawyer's resolution of an inherently
difficult moral dilemma.
Contrary to these assertions in the commentary to the Rules,
proposed Rule 1.7 would not place the attorney in an impossible
situation. It does not seek to destroy the confidentiality between
attorney and client, nor would it deprive a defendant of his con-
stitutional rights. However, it would ensure that under the unique
circumstances where bodily harm or death may be imminent, as
when a lawyer knows the location of a kidnapping victim, the lawyer's
duty would mandate disclosure.79
IV. Fruits and Instrumentalities of a Crime
Another dilemma is created when an attorney receives tangible
evidence of a client's offense in the form of either fruits or in-
strumentalities of the crime. Should these articles be protected by
73. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
74. Flaherty, supra note 42, at 11, col. 1.
75. Id.
76. See RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 comment.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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legal and ethical principles? As an officer of the court, should the
attorney disclose their existence and turn them over to either the
prosecuting authorities or the court? There is a paucity of law on
the subject.80 Nevertheless, the better-reasoned view of the majority
is that an attorney may not conceal tangible evidence of a crime. 8'
In In re Ryder,82 the defendant, while being questioned by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about a bank robbery,83 tele-
phoned his attorney, Ryder. While speaking with his lawyer, the
client denied that he had committed the robbery, maintaining that
the money the FBI seized from him had been won in a "crap" game.8
Pursuant to this conversation, Ryder went to his client's safe deposit
box and extracted a large sum of cash and a sawed-off shotgun.
He placed these articles in another safe deposit box in his own
name. 5
During his ensuing disciplinary hearing, Ryder claimed that the
attorney-client privilege protected the articles.8 6 He asserted that he
intended to reimburse the money to the victimized bank following
his client's trial.87 The district court rejected both of these contentions
and suspended Ryder for eighteen months pursuant to the then-
existing Canons of Ethics.88 The court concluded that Ryder intended
"to assist [the defendant] by keeping the stolen money and the
shotgun concealed in his lockbox until after the trial."8 9 Relying on
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,90 and Wigmore on
Evidence,9' the court concluded that the attorney's conduct "went
far beyond the receipt and retention of a confidential communication
from his client." 92 The court held that under the circumstances,
Ryder was not privileged to take possession of and retain the fruits
and instrumentalities of the crime. 93
As Ryder demonstrates, an important factor in determining a
80. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1207 (Alaska 1978).
81. See infra notes 93, 102, & 105 and accompanying text.
82. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). For a
complete discussion of Ryder, see Comment, Professional Responsibility and In Re
Ryder; Can An Attorney Serve Two Masters?, 54 VA. L. REV. 145 (1968).
83. 263 F. Supp. at 362.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 363.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 363.
88. Id. at 364.
89. Id. at 365.
90. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
91. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
92. 263 F. Supp. at 365.
93. Id.
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lawyer's duty with regard to tangible evidence is the existence of
criminal statutes prohibiting secreting or tampering with evidence of
a crime. 94 Thus, in Ryder, the court found that the attorney knowingly
concealed stolen property in contravention of the statute prohibiting
such conduct. 95 In People v. Lee,96 the client's wife delivered blood-
stained shoes to the public defender. 97 He, in turn, delivered them
to the judge pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor. 9 During
the client's trial, these events were revealed. 99
The defendant sought unsuccessfully to prevent admission of the
shoes into evidence.o°° The California court held that it was proper
to seize the shoes by warrant and that the attorney-client privilege
did not give an attorney the right to withhold evidence.' 0 The court
stated that it would be an abuse of the attorney's duty of professional
responsibility to knowingly take possession of and secrete instru-
mentalities of a crime.102 The court further held that it had been
proper for the attorney to testify. 03 Also, in Morrell v. State,'04 the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that an attorney has an ethical duty
to deliver fruits and instrumentalities of crime to the prosecuting
authorities. 05 As these cases show, neither the ethical nor the evi-
dentiary rules of confidentiality cover all situations. The California
and Alaska courts placed the lawyer's duty as an officer of the
94. Id. at 369. The court quoted from the Code of Virginia, § 18.1-107, which
provided: "If any person buys or receives from another person, or aid [sic] in
concealing, any stolen goods or other thing, knowing the same to have been stolen,
he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, although
the principal offender be not convicted." VA. CODE § 18.1-107 (1950) (repealed
1975); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1975) (forbidding suppression
of evidence).
95. 263 F. Supp. at 369.
96. 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1970).
97. Id. at 524, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
98. Id. at 524-25, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 525, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
101. Id. at 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
102. Id. (quoting In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714).
103. 3 Cal. App. 3d 527, 83 Cal. Rptr. 723. In Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d
871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court held that an attorney who delivers stolen
property to the police need not divulge his client's identity or the manner in which
he gained possesion of the items. Furthermore, the court prohibited the prosecutor
from informing the jury that the property was obtained from the defendant's
attorney. Id. at 875.
104. 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978). In Morrell, a handwritten plan to carry out
a kidnapping scheme was received from the defendant's house guest. The court
held that the attorney properly delivered this evidence to the prosecutor. Id. at
1212.
105. 575 P.2d at 1207.
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court ahead of the duty to defend his client, thereby carving out
exceptions to the rule of confidentiality.' 0 6
There is, however, law to the contrary. In one of the leading
cases, State v. Olwell,107 the defendant's attorney refused to comply
with a subpoena duces tecum'0 s which sought production of a knife
allegedly used by his client in the commission of a homicide. 0 9 0lwell
asserted the attorney-client privilege and was cited for contempt by
a Washington state court." '0 However, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington reversed, finding that the knife was protected by the attorney-
client privilege."' Relying on a Florida case," 2 the court concluded
that communication with a client encompassed delivery of instru-
mentalities by the client to the attorney." 3 However, the court cau-
tioned that after a reasonable period of time, the attorney must
deliver the evidence to the authorities."14
However, Olwell represents an aberration rather than the rule.
The court improperly balanced society's interest in a truthful criminal
justice system against the client's interest in a confidential attorney-
client relationship." 5 The norm should be the well-reasoned conclu-
sion of Ryder,116 that fruits and instrumentalities are not, nor should
they be, protected by the attorney-client privilege." 7
Another issue relating to tangible objects is whether the attorney
should testify about the articles and how he came to possess them.
Although language in Morrell"' and Lee' 19 indicates that it was
proper for the attorneys to testify about the evidence in their pos-
106. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722; Morrell, 575 P.2d at
1211.
107. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
108. Subpoena duces tecum is defined as "[a] process by which the court, at
the instance of a party, commands a witness who has in his possession or control
some document or page that is pertinent to the issue of a pending controversy,
to produce it at the trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
109. 394 P.2d at 682.
110. Id. at 683.
111. Id. at 684.
112. Dupree v. Better Way, Inc., 80 Fla. 500, 86 So. 2d 425 (1956) (privileged
communication encompasses information as well as objects which clients deliver to
attorney).
113. 64 Wash. 2d at 830, 394 P.2d at 683-84; cf. Dyas v. State, 539 S.W.2d
251 (Ark. 1976) (property not protected as client confidence because lawyer obtained
it from third person rather than from client; Olwell thus distinguished).
114. 64 Wash. 2d at 831, 394 P.2d at 684-85.
115. Id. at 830, 394 P.2d at 684.
116. 263 F. Supp. 360.
117. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
118. 575 P.2d 1200, 1207.
119. 3 Cal. App. 3d 527, 83 Cal. Rptr. 723.
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session, a landmark New York case holds otherwise. In People v.
Beige, 120 attorney Beige and his partner were appointed to represent
a defendant accused of murder. Upon interviewing his client, Belge
learned not only that the client had committed three other murders
but also the location of one corpse.12' Beige drove to the area his
client had described and confirmed that a body was there. 122
This sequence of events was revealed during the course of the
trial. Consequently, Beige was indicted for violation of the New
York Health Laws.12  He sought dismissal of the charge on the
ground that the discovery of the corpse was attributable to statements
obtained through the lawyer-client relationship and thus was priv-
ileged. 24 The court dismissed the indictment and quoted with ap-
proval from the amicus curiae brief submitted by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, which asserted that Beige
was "constitutionally exempt from any statutory requirement to
disclose the location of the body," and in fact was "under a positive
stricture precluding such disclosure." 25
Belge is distinguishable from Ryder, Lee, Olwell and Morrell to
the extent that it involved an indictment against an attorney under
state health laws and dealt only peripherally with the criminal pros-
ecution of the client. However, it is important to consider Beige
since it later served as the foundation for an important limitation
on the confidentiality rule.
In People v. Meredith,2 6 the California Supreme Court generally
upheld the principle of confidentiality but cautioned that, once a
client informs his attorney of the location of the physical evidence,
confidentiality will be lost if the evidence is either moved or altered.2 7
The court reasoned that tampering with evidence dissolves the con-
fidential relationship because
[w]hen defense counsel alters or removes physical evidence, he
necessarily deprives the prosecution of the opportunity to observe
120. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), aff'd,
50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359
N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
121. 83 Misc. 2d at 187, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 187, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800.
125. Id. at 190, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
126. 29 Cal. 3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981); see Martin, The
Razor's Edge of Conflicting Duties, 4 CAL. LAWYER 15 (1984); Note, People v.
Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional
Rights, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1048 (1982).
127. 29 Cal. 3d 694, 631 P.2d at 53, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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that evidence in its original condition or location . . . . [T]o bar
admission of testimony concerning the original condition and
location of the evidence in such a case permits the defense in
effect to "destroy" critical information .... 18
Thus, Meredith suggests that courts should create exceptions to
the protection of the attorney-client privilege in situations where
counsel has removed or altered evidence.129 However, the court
specifically stated that when the defense attorney leaves the evidence
as he finds it, those observations derived from privileged commu-
nications are insulated from disclosure.30
A helpful method of analyzing cases involving fruits and instru-
mentalities was set forth in a recent opinion of the New York City
Bar Association.' 3 ' An attorney wrote to the New York City Bar
Association Ethics Committee for guidance regarding the following
matter: a new client met with his attorney, showed him a gun, and
stated that the gun had just been fired at someone. The attorney
believed that this firing of the gun constituted a crime. To protect
the people in his office, the attorney took the weapon and placed
it in his office safe. He then referred the client to a lawyer specializing
in criminal matters. Later, the lawyer learned that the client had
been charged with a felony. Believing that the gun was unregistered,
the lawyer inquired as to his ethical obligations with respect to the
evidence in his safe. 32
Prefacing its decision by commenting that the lawyer's duties are
coextensive with the legal obligations of any other citizen,'33 the
committee concluded that the lawyer might be obligated by law to
turn over the gun to the authorities but could not voluntarily reveal
the circumstances under which the weapon came into his possession. 134
Citing Canon 4,135 the committee outlined and applied a two-part
analysis. First, the lawyer must decide whether and to what extent
the instrumentality and/or the circumstances of its receipt constitute
confidences or secrets under the Code.'3 6 Second, the lawyer must
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 695, 631 P.2d at 54, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 620.




135. CODE, supra note 10, CANON 4.
136. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-99. DR 4-101(A) of the
Code distinguishes between confidences and secrets as follows: " 'Confidence' refers
to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and
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determine whether, and to what extent, he is required by law to
reveal any confidences or secrets involving the client's visit and
delivery of the instrumentality of the crime. 3 7 In the situation pre-
sented, the committee concluded that the information was a secret
and thus fell within the ambit of Canon 4. '38 The committee then
inquired as to whether relevant law required that the attorney reveal
client confidences. The committee noted state statutes forbidding
suppression of evidence and outlawing possession of guns by un-
licensed persons.'3 9 It concluded that since the Code subjects to
disciplinary sanctions lawyers whose conduct is "prejudicial to the
administration of justice,"' 140 if the applicable law forbids retention
of the gun as unlawful suppression of evidence, the Code similarly
proscribes such retention as a violation of the Disciplinary Rules
even though turning over the gun may involve revealing a client
secret. 141 The committee further asserted that the lawyer had a
corresponding duty to limit any disclosure of information to items
that he was required by law to reveal. 42 Consequently, if a lawyer
decides that he must turn over certain physical evidence, he must
do so in a manner that does not jeopardize protected information.
After surrendering the evidence, the lawyer must endeavor to preserve
any remaining client confidences unless the court directs otherwise. 141
The committee emphasized the importance of the manner in which
a lawyer representing a criminal defendant delivers the fruits or
instrumentalities to the court. By simply informing the court that
he possesses physical evidence, a lawyer may prejudice his client. "44
Since the Code permits disclosure only to the extent required by
law, 45 an attorney must determine the minimum required by law,
and he may not divulge information beyond those requirements which
would reveal confidences or secrets. Moreover, if a lawyer is asked
'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be em-
barrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client." CODE, supra note 10, DR
4- 101(A).
137. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 81-99.
138. Id.; see supra note 136, which sets forth the Code's definition of secrets.
139. The committee cited N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1975) (forbidding
suppression of evidence) and N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01-265.05 (McKinney 1980
& Supp. 1984) (outlawing possession of guns by unlicensed persons). New York
City Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 81-99.
140. CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(5).




145. CODE, supra note 10, DR 4-101(C)(2).
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by the court to explain the circumstances under which he came to
possess evidence, he is ethically bound to assert the attorney-client
privilege and refuse to answer. The lawyer must not divulge his
client's secrets unless he is subject to a court order. 46 The committee,
therefore, opined that if the law allows the attorney to deliver the
evidence anonymously to the prosecuting authorities, he must follow
that course and must refrain from further action which might prej-
udice the client's interests.
47
A. Recommendations
It is unthinkable that an attorney's office might become a sto-
rehouse for contraband. It is equally outrageous for a lawyer to
become an aider and abettor of criminal activity. As the cases
discussed above 48 clearly show, these actions substantially impair
the criminal justice system. 149 Furthering the proper goals of justice
must take precedence over the duty of confidentiality which a lawyer
owes to his client. Therefore, the interests of society mandate that
an attorney deliver to the authorities the fruits and instrumentalities
of a crime which come into his possession.
Unfortunately, once he has released the evidence, the attorney has
not totally resolved his dilemma. He must decide whether to explain
his possession of the incriminating evidence or to remain silent. 50
Although speaking out could eviscerate his client's right under the
sixth amendment to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial,'
the attorney's silence could also be detrimental to his client.
Depositing the physical evidence with the administrative judge of
the court rather than the prosecuting authorities is a more practical
solution than anonymous delivery.1 2 The administrative judge is able
to determine what may be disclosed and what must remain confi-
dential, and furthermore, as an impartial and detached party, he
may serve as a buffer between the prosecuting authorities and the
146. Id.; New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 81-99.
147. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 81-99.
148. See supra notes 82-106 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 108, 118, 119, 132, 136, 145, 146 and accompanying text.
151. See CODE, supra note 10, EC 4-1.
152. The position of chief administrator, or administrative judge of the New
York court system, is described in the New York Judiciary Law. N.Y. JUD. LAW
§§ 210-217 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1984). The chief administrative judge is vested
with authority to designate administrative judges for the lower state courts, id. §
212(1)(d), and to adopt rules and orders regulating practice in the courts. Id. §
212(2)(d).
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client.' By revealing the evidence to the administrative judge rather
than the prosecuting authorities, it is less likely to be used to the
client's disadvantage. 154
Establishing a uniform method to handle the attorney's predic-
ament is just as important as preserving the client's sixth amendment
rights. By consistently resorting to the administrative judge, defense
attorneys would not make these decisions alone. The efficient func-
tioning of the criminal justice system would be enhanced by pro-
cedural consistency. Public esteem for lawyers would probably
increase.' Therefore, an exception should be carved out of the
doctrine of confidentiality to allow lawyers to turn over fruits and
instrumentalities evidence to a neutral administrative judge. 156
V. Corporate Fraud
Any discussion of Rule 1.6 would be incomplete without consid-
eration of another issue: when a lawyer or law firm becomes the
unwitting participant in a client's fraud, should confidentiality be
sacrificed to permit the lawyer to rectify the fraud? Ironically, at
the time when the ABA House of Delegates voted to delete the
client fraud exception from Rule 1.6,1 a large-scale corporate fraud
implicating several attorneys became public.' On September 23,
1981, the law firm retained by O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. (O.P.M.)
153. Although the administrative judge is not specifically vested with authority
to perform these functions under the New York Judiciary Law, it could be argued
that such duties are encompassed within the administrative judge's general super-
visory duties. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 211 (McKinney 1983). Furthermore, the law could
be amended to provide a specific grant of authority to administrative judges in
cases involving confidentiality claims.
154. The client is protected because information about his identity and the
circumstances under which the evidence was recovered would not be revealed to
the trial judge. See Bender, Incriminating Evidence: What to Do With a Hot
Potato, 11 CoLo. LAWYER 881, 892 (1982).
155. See Brown, supra note 11, at 34, quoting trial lawyer W. Sidney Davis of
New York. Davis asserted:
The decline of the American lawyer's professional independence leads to
growing disrespect for the whole legal process. Since the public's per-
ception of attorneys is that they are too often advocates for hire to the
highest bidder, guided by low personal scruples and encouraged by a
system that rewards results without concern for the sanctity of the system
of justice itself, can the disrepute of the rule of law be far behind?
Id.
156. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
157. See Wermeil, supra note 47, at 6, col. 2.
158. See Blustein and Penn, Advice or Consent: O.P.M. Fraud Raises Questions
About Role of a Criminal's Lawyer, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
[hereinafter cited as Blustein and Penn].
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announced that it would no longer represent O.P.M. 15 9 The circum-
stances leading up to that resignation highlight the need for a
commercial fraud exception to the confidentiality rule.
O.P.M. had engaged in the business of matching customers who
wished to lease computers with financial institutions who purchased
computers and leased them to customers.' 60 To secure multimillion
dollar loans from financial institutions, O.P.M's owners, Myron
Goodman and Mordecai Weissman, often used a single computer
as collateral for several different loans. 6' Later, when larger funds
were required, Goodman created false documents showing numerous
leasing agreements to lure investors. 62
From its inception in 1970, O.P.M. retained a law firm to close
the loans and issue opinion letters confirming the legality of leasing
agreements 63 which were relied on by investors. 64 In June, 1980,
Goodman hinted to a senior partner of the law firm that he had
done something wrong involving millions of dollars but would not
elaborate further. Goodman gave the lawyer a sealed envelope con-
taining a letter from O.P.M.'s chief in-house accountant which
purportedly revealed the accountant's knowledge of the fraud. 65
Although there were conflicting accounts as to the firm's later
dealings with the in-house accountant, and it appears that the mem-
bers of the firm did not open the envelope or read the letter, it is
clear that the law firm had reason to suspect fraud. 66
The law firm consulted an attorney specializing in legal ethics and
was advised not to disclose any past fraud and not to aid ongoing
or new frauds.167 As to future transactions, the firm was advised
to verify that lease agreements collateralizing computer purchases
were genuine;' 68 but it was also told that if it believed the client's
representations, independent verification and investigation were not
necessary. 69 Therefore, prior to each loan closing, the law firm
159. Id. at 6, col. 3.
160. Id. at 1, col. 6.
161. Id.; Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1983, (Magazine), at 31, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Ethics and the Law].
162. Id. at 33, col. 1.
163. Id. at 33, col. 1.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The attorney for John A. Clifton, the chief in-house accountant, recounted
that Singer Hutner tried to persuade Clifton to remain silent. Hutner, however,
stated that he neither asked Clifton to withdraw the letter nor refused to listen to
Clifton's information. Id. at col. 2.
167. Id. at 33, col. 3.
168. Id. at 46, col. 2.
169. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
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required Goodman to certify in writing that each lease agreement
was legitimate.7 0 Nevertheless, the frauds continued, amounting to
over $70 million during the summer of 1980.17' In September, 1980,
Goodman confessed a portion of his fraudulent activities to the firm,
but he did not reveal that the frauds were ongoing. 72 The firm then
attempted, unsuccessfully, to independently verify the lease agree-
ments. 17
On September 23, 1980, the firm informed Goodman that it had
decided to withdraw as O.P.M.'s legal counsel in a gradual process
designed to minimize injury to the client. 74 The firm was advised
by its ethics counsel that under the Code, it was barred from revealing
any details of the fraud. 75 Therefore, when O.P.M. retained another
law firm, the second firm was not warned of the fraud. 7 6
That the ongoing fraud was not rectified in the O.P.M. situation,
where the lawyers appeared to have complied with the dictates of
the Code, 77 highlights the Code's inadequacies. The Kutak
Commission 7 1 sought to remedy this inadequacy by permitting dis-
closure of a secret to rectify a fraud. 79
However, this "whistle blowing"' 80 provision was rejected by the
House of Delegates.' 8 ' Instead, under the Code, the only feasible
course of action for an attorney who discovers his client's fraud
outside of the courtroom milieu is to withdraw from representation.8 2
He cannot warn the lawyers who succeed him. Thus, the fraud may
remain undiscovered and may continue.
Despite the incompatibility of this result with the interests of
Op. 335 (1974) (lawyer must inquire into facts relevant to opinion letter written
for sales of unregistered securities; further inquiry needed only where client's answer
is incomplete, suspect, inconsistent or open to question).
170. Ethics and the Law, supra note 161, at 46.
171. Blustein and Penn, supra note 158, at 1, col. 6.
172. Id. at 6, col. 3.
173. Id.
174. Id. During the period of withdrawal, Singer Hutner independently verified
lease agreements and demanded that O.P.M. cease new tax shelter financing. Ethics
and the Law, supra note 161, at 48, col. 5.
175. Id. at 49, col. I; see also CODE, supra note 10, EC 4-6 (1979) ("obligation
of lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client continues after the
termination of his employment").
176. Ethics and the Law, supra note 161, at 49, col. 2.
177. Id. at 52, col. 2.
178. See Kutak, supra note 59.
179. Id. at 424.
180. For an example of the usage of this colloquialism which refers to those
who inform on others, see Wermeil, supra note 47, at 6, col. 2.
181. See id. at 6, col. 2.
182. See supra note 55.
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society, the principles behind it continue to receive support. For
example, a policy statement of the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking, and Business Law'83 provides that the vital confidentiality
involved in lawyer-client consultation and advice would be seriously
impaired if lawyers were required to disclose confidential information
to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or other agencies. 8 4
According to the statement, "any such compelled disclosure would
seriously and adversely affect the lawyer's function as counselor,
and may seriously and adversely affect the ability of lawyers as
advocates to represent and defend their clients' interests."' 85 Thus,
in this sphere, there is a distinct trend toward greater confidentiality,
regardless of whether the contemplated fraud involves the SEC, the
Internal Revenue Service, or innocent third parties.86
A. Recommendations
Some critics resist permitting lawyers to become aiders and abettors
of fraud by active, though unknowing, participation or by knowingly
remaining silent. For example, in February, 1983, Senator Arlen
Spector introduced a bill which made it a crime for an attorney to
mail documents that enable a client to commit, or assist a client in
committing a crime.'87 Under this bill, an attorney would be subject
to a fine or imprisonment, or both for failure to timely disclose a
crime or fraud to federal law enforcement officials. 8
That Congress would consider passing a criminal law to be enforced
183. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Recommen-
dation Regarding Resonsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising With Respect
to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, reprinted in N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM
APPROACH 222 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Recommendation].
184. Id.
185. Id. at 223.
186. See generally Marsan, Tax Shelter Opinions: Ethical Responsibilities of the
Tax Attorney, 9 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 237 (1982); Myers, The Attorney-Client Re-
lationship and the Code of Professional Responsibility: Suggested Attorney Liability
for Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud to Securities and Exchange Commission, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 1113 (1976); Robins, Policeman, Conscience or Confidant:
Thoughts on the Appropriate Response of a Securities Attorney Who Suspects
Client Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 373 (1982);
Wilczek, Corporate Confidentiality: Problems and Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel,
7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221 (1982); Note, The Need for Attorney-Client Confidentiality
in Securities Regulation: S.E.C. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 46 ALB. L.
REV. 1354 (1982).
187. S. Res. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S.1198-99 (daily ed.
Feb. 16, 1983).
188. Id. at 1199.
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exclusively against lawyers reflects poorly on the legal profession. Tradi-
tionally, law has been a self-regulated profession governed by the Code
of Ethics.' 8 9 Federal laws should not be necessary. To avoid outside
regulation, the profession should prohibit its members from becom-
ing involved in client fraud. When the states adopt the Model Rules,
they should include a provision allowing disclosure of client confidences
when necessary to prevent or rectify that client's faud.
VI. Conclusion
Although the confidentiality rule is a cornerstone of criminal
defense, it is not absolute. The rights of individual clients must be
balanced against society's interests.' 90 Generally, confidentiality should
be preserved. While an attorney's suspicion of potential danger should
not require mandatory disclosure, reasonable certainty of the exist-
ence of such danger should create a duty to reveal client secrets.' 9
Therefore, when an attorney learns from his client of an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily harm to a third party, disclosure
should be mandatory.
As a matter of public policy, safeguarding and preserving human
life far outweigh the considerations underlying the confidentiality
rule. Over forty years ago, the American Bar Association declared:
There are some circumstances under which . . . a communication
is not privileged for reasons founded on sound principles of public
policy. In such cases the attorney may not remain silent. When
the communications of the client to the attorney are made with
respect to commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing
wrong, the communication is not privileged. 92
Ascertainment of truth is a fundamental goal of the adversarial
system.' 9 A limited exception to the confidentiality rule would not
interfere with a client's constitutional rights or with the orderly
administration of justice. Such an exception could prevent serious
injury to potential witnesses, members of the judiciary and others
189. See RULES, supra note 1, Preamble § 11 ("legal profession's relative autonomy
carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. . . . Every lawyer is
responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct.").
190. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
191. Cf. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (requiring
attorney to be fair and candid when practicing before Internal Revenue Service).
192. Cf. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 250 (1943).
193. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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who, but for the lawyer's timely disclosure, might be irreparably
harmed. Furthermore, it would enhance the system by increasing
the esteem which the public holds for lawyers as a group. 94 High
moral character is required of candidates to the Bar.' 95 This same
degree of morality must be required of practicing attorneys as well.
If the mandatory disclosure rule were adopted by the profession,
lawyers no longer would be viewed as unscrupulous technocrats.
Instead, the legal profession would be perceived as one dedicated
to the paramount goal of any society-the safeguarding of human
life.
194. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
195., CODE, supra note 10, EC 1-3, DR 1-101(B).
